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Abstract—Rings are quite common in both road traffic net-
works as well as in telecommunication networks. In the road
traffic context, we often find rings surrounding towns and cities.
Traffic over these rings is either bidirectional or we may find
two rings that surround the town carrying traffic in opposite
directions (clockwise and anti-clockwise). Telecommunication
networks based on rings have been often used both as local area
networks as well as in metropolitan area networks and here too
we find both bidirectional networks as well as networks consisting
of two rings carrying traffic in opposite directions. Each decision
maker (e.g. the drivers, in the case of road traffic, and perhaps
Internet access providers, in the case of telecommunication) is
faced with a simple routing decision: whether to go clockwise
or anti-clockwise. Assuming a simple source-destination demand
matrix, we analyze this problem as a non-cooperative game and
derive several interesting characteristics of the equilibria.
I. INTRODUCTION
The analysis of selfish routing over ring networks has
attracted the attention of researchers in both road traffic as
well as telecommunication network engineering. Indeed, ring
type roads have been deployed around big cities, allowing
vehicles that do not need to enter the city to take the peripheral
route, thereby suffer from and cause less congestion. Various
research papers thus study the traffic assignment problem for
cities that have only radial and circumferential roads (see
[1], [2] and references therein). Rings are also common in
telecommunication networks, with the Token Ring standard
IEEE 802.5 for local area networks, and the standardized
metropolitan area networks such as the FDDI and the DQDB
[3]. Optimal or competitive routing over these networks has
also been studied. Unlike road traffic assignment problems in
which the solution concept is often taken to be the Wardrop
equilibrium, in telecommunication applications, it is the Nash
equilibrium that has emerged (along with its comparison to
the global optimal). Papers that have studied routing in this
context assume in general that flows are non-splittable [4].
In this paper we consider the framework of Nash equilib-
rium (splittable and non-splittable) as well as that of Wardrop
equilibrium. Instead of focusing on routing choices between
radial and circumference routes, as is usually done, we focus
on the choice of direction: for a given source and destination
on the peripheral network, there is a possibility to arrive at
the destination going either clockwise or anti-clockwise. We
consider two frameworks: (i) the network consists of a single
bidirectional ring, and (ii) it consists of two unidirectional
Fig. 1. Competitive routing on a bidirectional circular network.
Fig. 2. Competitive routing between two unidirectional circular paths.
rings in opposite directions.
There are 𝑛 nodes on the ring, each identified with a player.
We study an extreme scenario in which all traffic that arrives
at a node has to be shipped to the next node. This case is
extreme since it is the most unbalanced one, in the sense that
the traffic that a player sends through the direct path has only
one hop to go, where as the traffic that it sends through the
alternative route has to go through 𝑛 − 1 hops. Even with
this simple demand matrix, which is clearly biased in favor of
choosing the direct path, we establish the counter-intuitive fact:
“It is possible that not all players send their traffic through
the direct path at equilibrium.” Also, in the case where not all
players send their traffic through the direct path, we provide
interesting characterizations of the relative magnitudes of their
demands.
II. THE MODEL
We consider 𝑛 nodes on a circle, indexed by 0, 1, . . . , 𝑛−1.
Each node 𝑘 corresponds to one player that has to ship a
demand 𝜙𝑘(> 0) to the next node, i.e., to node 𝑘 + 1. It
can use the direct path (𝑘, 𝑘 + 1) or the indirect one, (𝑘, 𝑘 −
1, . . . , 0, 𝑛− 1, 𝑛− 2, . . . , 𝑘+ 1). (Note that node indices are
modulo 𝑛.) Throughout the paper, we assume that 𝑛 > 2,
since the concept of a direct/indirect path is meaningful only if
𝑛 > 2. We consider two possibilities: (i) a single bidirectional
link (Figure 1), and (ii) two unidirectional links (Figure 2). In
the bidirectional case, we call the link between node 𝑘 and
node 𝑘 + 1 simply link 𝑘. In the unidirectional case, the link
from node 𝑘 to node 𝑘+1 shall be called link 𝑘, and the link
from node 𝑘 + 1 to node 𝑘 shall be called link 𝑘′.
Let 𝑥𝑘 and 𝑥′𝑘 denote the total amount of flow on link 𝑘
and link 𝑘′, respectively. Let 𝑥𝑘𝑘 and 𝛼𝑘 denote the amount
and fraction, respectively, of class 𝑘 flow through the direct
path, i.e., through link 𝑘. We call
𝜶 = (𝛼0, . . . , 𝛼𝑛−1)
the assignment vector. For a given demand vector
𝝓 = (𝜙0, . . . , 𝜙𝑛−1),
the assignment vector 𝜶 completely specifies the flow vector
𝒙 = (𝑥00, . . . , 𝑥
𝑛−1
𝑛−1) = (𝛼0𝜙0, . . . , 𝛼𝑛−1𝜙𝑛−1).
When considering a symmetric demand, we denote 𝜙𝑘 by
𝜙. When considering a symmetric flow, we denote 𝑥𝑘 and
𝑥𝑘𝑘 by 𝑥 and 𝑥, respectively. When considering a symmetric
assignment, we denote 𝛼𝑘 by 𝛼.
The cost density of link 𝑘 (i.e., cost per unit of flow) is
given by 𝑇𝑘(𝑥𝑘) when the amount of flow on link 𝑘 is 𝑥𝑘.
Note that the link cost function 𝑇𝑘(⋅) of link 𝑘 depends only
on the amount of flow on link 𝑘. We define the marginal
cost function 𝜏𝑘(𝑥) of link 𝑘 by 𝜏𝑘(𝑥) := 𝑑(𝑥𝑇𝑘(𝑥))/𝑑𝑥. We
assume that the costs are additive in that the total cost over
a path is equal to the sum of costs incurred over each of the
links constituting the path. When considering symmetric link
costs, we denote 𝑇𝑘(⋅) and 𝜏𝑘(⋅) by 𝑇 (⋅) and 𝜏(⋅), respectively.
Throughout the paper, we have the following assumptions
on the link cost functions 𝑇𝑘(⋅).
A 1. The link cost functions 𝑇𝑘(⋅) are nonnegative, strictly
increasing, continuously differentiable.
A 2. For all 𝑘, 𝑥 > 0 implies 𝑇𝑘(𝑥) > 0.
Throughout the paper, we will implicitly assume that A1
and A2 hold. Depending on the context, we may also assume
one or more of the following.
A 3. The link cost functions are identical.
A 4. For every link 𝑘, the function 𝑥𝑇𝑘(𝑥) is convex.
A 5. For all 𝑘, the function 𝑇𝑘(⋅) is subadditive.
III. WARDROP EQUILIBRIUM AND GLOBAL OPTIMALITY
Recall that a routing game is completely specified by the
tuple (𝐺,𝝓,𝑻 ), where 𝐺 denotes the network graph, 𝝓
denotes the demand vector and 𝑻 denotes the vector of link
cost functions. We will need the following theorem by Beck-
mann et al. [5] to study global optimality (see the discussion
surrounding Corollary 18.10 of [6] for an explanation). Note
that, we have rephrased the original theorem by Beckmann et
al. [5] to fit our model and terminology.
Theorem 1 (Beckmann et al. [5]). If A1 and A4 hold, then
an assignment 𝜶∗ is an optimal assignment of the game
(𝐺,𝝓,𝑻 ) if and only if it is a Wardrop equilibrium assignment
of the game (𝐺,𝝓, 𝝉 ), where 𝜏𝑘(⋅) denotes the marginal cost
function corresponding to the link cost function 𝑇𝑘(⋅).
A. Bidirectional Link
The flow on link 𝑘 in this case is given by
𝑥𝑘 = 𝑥
𝑘
𝑘 +
∑
𝑗 ∕=𝑘
(𝜙𝑗 − 𝑥𝑗𝑗) = 𝛼𝑘𝜙𝑘 +
∑
𝑗 ∕=𝑘
(1− 𝛼𝑗)𝜙𝑗 . (1)
Allowing the demands and the cost functions to be asym-
metric we obtain the following theorem.
Theorem 2. At Wardrop equilibrium, for all classes, except
perhaps one, traffic goes through the direct path.1
Proof. Assume that class 𝑖 does not send all its traffic
through link 𝑖, i.e., 𝛼𝑖 < 1. Then, for all 𝑘 ∕= 𝑖, we have
𝑥𝑘 = 𝛼𝑘𝜙𝑘 +
∑
𝑗 ∕=𝑘
(1− 𝛼𝑗)𝜙𝑗 ≥ (1− 𝛼𝑖)𝜙𝑖 > 0,
i.e., 𝑥𝑘 > 0, implying that 𝑇𝑘(𝑥𝑘) > 0. Also, by Wardrop
principle, we have
∑
𝑘 ∕=𝑖 𝑇𝑘(𝑥𝑘) ≤ 𝑇𝑖(𝑥𝑖). Thus, we conclude
that, for all 𝑘 ∕= 𝑖, 𝑇𝑘(𝑥𝑘) < 𝑇𝑖(𝑥𝑖). The cost for player 𝑘 ∕= 𝑖
over its indirect path is at least 𝑇𝑖(𝑥𝑖), since the indirect path
of a player 𝑘 ∕= 𝑖 contains link 𝑖, whereas its cost over its
direct path equals 𝑇𝑘(𝑥𝑘). Hence, 𝑇𝑘(𝑥𝑘) < 𝑇𝑖(𝑥𝑖) implies
that, all players, other than 𝑖, use their direct path only.
The following corollaries are immediate from Theorem 2.
Corollary 1. If A4 holds, then the global optimum also
corresponds to an assignment 𝜶 such that 𝛼𝑘 = 1 for every
class 𝑘, except perhaps one class.
Proof. Note that Theorem 2 still applies if we replace the
costs 𝑇𝑘(⋅) by their marginal costs 𝜏𝑘(⋅). The corollary is then
immediate from Theorems 1 and 2.
Corollary 2. If the demands and the cost functions are such
that,
𝑇𝑖∗(𝜙𝑖∗) ≤
∑
𝑘 ∕=𝑖∗
𝑇𝑘(𝜙𝑘),
where 𝑖∗ ∈ argmax𝑖 𝑇𝑖(𝜙𝑖), then, for all classes, traffic goes
through the direct path at Wardrop equilibrium.
Proof. Suppose that there exists a class 𝑖 for which not all
the traffic is routed through the direct path, i.e., 𝛼𝑖 < 1. By
Theorem 2, all the traffic of class 𝑘 ∕= 𝑖 is routed through the
direct path. Thus, 𝑥𝑖 = 𝛼𝑖𝜙𝑖 < 𝜙𝑖, and, for all 𝑘 ∕= 𝑖, we have
𝑥𝑘 = 𝜙𝑘 + (1− 𝛼𝑖)𝜙𝑖 > 𝜙𝑘. Then,
∑
𝑘 ∕=𝑖
𝑇𝑘(𝑥𝑘) >
∑
𝑘 ∕=𝑖
𝑇𝑘(𝜙𝑘) ≥ 𝑇𝑖(𝜙𝑖) > 𝑇𝑖(𝑥𝑖),
1Recall that A1 and A2 are assumed to hold throughout the paper.
implying that, for class 𝑖, the cost of the indirect path is strictly
larger than the cost of the direct path which contradicts 𝛼𝑖 < 1
at equilibrium. Thus, 𝛼𝑖 must be equal to 1.
Next, we restrict the cost functions to be identical, and
obtain the following theorem.
Theorem 3. If A3 holds and not all traffic of a given class 𝑖
uses the direct path at Wardrop equilibrium, then the demand
𝜙𝑖 of this class is strictly larger than that of any other class.
If, in addition, A5 also holds, then 𝜙𝑖 >
∑
𝑘 ∕=𝑖 𝜙𝑘, i.e., the
demand of class 𝑖 is strictly larger than the sum of the demands
of the remaining classes.
Proof. Let 𝑖 be the class for which not all the traffic is
routed through the direct path. By Theorem 2, all the traffic
of class 𝑘 ∕= 𝑖 is routed through the direct path. Thus, for all
𝑘 ∕= 𝑖, we have 𝑥𝑘 > 𝜙𝑘. Suppose that 𝜙𝑗 ≥ 𝜙𝑖 for some
𝑗 ∕= 𝑖. Then the cost of the indirect path for class 𝑖, satisfies
∑
𝑘 ∕=𝑖
𝑇 (𝑥𝑘) >
∑
𝑘 ∕=𝑖
𝑇 (𝜙𝑘) > 𝑇 (𝜙𝑗) ≥ 𝑇 (𝜙𝑖) > 𝑇 (𝑥𝑖),
i.e., the cost of the indirect path is strictly larger than the
direct path. This contradicts equilibrium, since we assumed
that a positive fraction of class 𝑖 traffic is routed through the
indirect path. Hence, it must hold that, for all 𝑘 ∕= 𝑖, 𝜙𝑖 > 𝜙𝑘.
For the second part of the theorem, note that, by Corollary
2, there is an index 𝑖∗ such that 𝑇 (𝜙𝑖∗) >
∑
𝑘 ∕=𝑖∗ 𝑇 (𝜙𝑘). By
the first part of this theorem and strict monotonicity of the cost
function, 𝑖∗ = 𝑖. Now, by subadditivity of the cost function,
we have,
𝑇 (𝜙𝑖) >
∑
𝑘 ∕=𝑖
𝑇 (𝜙𝑘) ≥ 𝑇 (
∑
𝑘 ∕=𝑖
𝜙𝑘) =⇒ 𝜙𝑖 >
∑
𝑘 ∕=𝑖
𝜙𝑘.
Next, we also restrict the demands to be symmetric, and
obtain the following theorem.
Corollary 3. If the demands and the cost functions are
symmetric, then the Wardrop equilibrium satisfy, for all 𝑘,
𝛼𝑘 = 1. In other words, only paths that are the shortest in
terms of number of hops are used. If, in addition, A4 also
holds, then the global optimal solution also corresponds to
𝛼∗𝑘 = 1 for all 𝑘.
Proof. By Corollary 2 and by symmetry, it follows that
all classes of traffic use only the direct path, and, for all 𝑘,
𝛼𝑘 = 1. By Corollary 1, under A4, traffic for an optimal flow
goes through the direct path for all classes, except perhaps
one. Suppose that 𝛼∗𝑖 < 1. Then, by Theorem 1, 𝛼∗𝑘 = 1 for
all 𝑘 ∕= 𝑖. Thus, 𝑥∗𝑖 = 𝛼∗𝑖 𝜙 < 𝜙 implying that 𝜏(𝑥∗𝑖 ) < 𝜏(𝜙),
and for all 𝑘 ∕= 𝑖, 𝑥∗𝑘 = 𝜙 + (1 − 𝛼𝑖)𝜙 > 𝜙 implying that
𝜏(𝑥∗𝑘) > 𝜏(𝜙). Since 𝛼∗𝑖 < 1, Wardrop equilibrium demands
that
∑
𝑘 ∕=𝑖 𝜏(𝑥
∗
𝑘) ≤ 𝜏(𝑥∗𝑖 ) implying that
∑
𝑘 ∕=𝑖 𝜏(𝜙) < 𝜏(𝜙),
which is impossible. Hence, we must have 𝛼∗𝑖 = 1, and the
global optimum corresponds to 𝛼∗𝑘 = 1 for all 𝑘.
B. Unidirectional Links
The amount of flow on link 𝑘 and 𝑘′ are given by
𝑥𝑘 = 𝑥
𝑘
𝑘 = 𝛼𝑘𝜙𝑘 ; 𝑥
′
𝑘 =
∑
𝑗 ∕=𝑘
(𝜙𝑗 − 𝑥𝑗𝑗) =
∑
𝑗 ∕=𝑘
(1− 𝛼𝑗)𝜙𝑗 (2)
Theorem 4. If A3 holds, then the Wardrop equilibrium con-
sists of sending all traffic to the right, i.e., through the shortest
paths in terms of number of hops if and only if
max
𝑘
𝑇 (𝜙𝑘) ≤ (𝑛− 1)𝑇 (0).
If
min
𝑘
𝑇 (𝜙𝑘) > (𝑛− 1)𝑇 (0),
then there is no pure Wardrop equilibrium.2
Proof. For each class 𝑘, the cost of the direct
path is 𝑇 (𝛼𝑘𝜙𝑘) and the cost of the indirect path is∑
𝑗 ∕=𝑘 𝑇 (
∑
𝑚 ∕=𝑗(1−𝛼𝑚)𝜙𝑚). The Wardrop equilibrium con-
sists of sending all traffic to the right if and only if, for each
class 𝑘, the cost of the direct path is less than or equal to the
cost of the indirect path with 𝛼1 = 𝛼2 = ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ = 𝛼𝑛 = 1. This
happens if and only if, for all 𝑘, 𝑇 (𝜙𝑘) ≤ (𝑛 − 1)𝑇 (0), i.e.,
if and only if max𝑘 𝑇 (𝜙𝑘) ≤ (𝑛− 1)𝑇 (0).
Suppose that there exists a pure Wardrop equilibrium with
a class 𝑖 such that 𝛼𝑖 = 0. Then, for class 𝑖, the cost of the
direct path is 𝑇𝐷𝑖 = 𝑇 (0) and the cost of the indirect path
is 𝑇 𝐼𝑖 ≥ (𝑛 − 1)𝑇 (𝜙𝑖), with equality if and only if class 𝑖 is
the only class for which all the traffic is routed through the
indirect path. Since 𝛼𝑖 = 0, we have 𝑇 𝐼𝑖 ≤ 𝑇𝐷𝑖 , which gives
(𝑛− 1)𝑇 (𝜙𝑖) ≤ 𝑇 𝐼𝑖 ≤ 𝑇𝐷𝑖 = 𝑇 (0),
or
(𝑛− 1)𝑇 (𝜙𝑖) ≤ 𝑇 (0).
Since
min
𝑘
𝑇 (𝜙𝑘) > (𝑛− 1)𝑇 (0) =⇒ 𝑇 (𝜙𝑖) > (𝑛− 1)𝑇 (0),
we have
(𝑛− 1)2𝑇 (0) < (𝑛− 1)𝑇 (𝜙𝑖) ≤ 𝑇 (0),
or
(𝑛− 1)2 < 1,
which is impossible for 𝑛 > 2. (Recall that we assume 𝑛 > 2.)
Hence, if min𝑘 𝑇 (𝜙𝑘) > (𝑛 − 1)𝑇 (0), there cannot be a
pure equilibrium with a class 𝑖 such that 𝛼𝑖 = 0.
The case 𝛼1 = 𝛼2 = ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ = 𝛼𝑛 = 1 is ruled out by the first
part of the proof.
The following corollary is immediate from Theorem 4.
Corollary 4. If the demands and the link costs are symmetric,
then the Wardrop equilibrium consists of sending all traffic to
the right, i.e., through the shortest paths in terms of number of
hops if and only if 𝑇 (𝜙) ≤ (𝑛−1)𝑇 (0). If 𝑇 (𝜙) > (𝑛−1)𝑇 (0),
then there is no pure Wardrop equilibrium.
2An equilibrium is said to be pure if each class sends all its traffic on one
path, i.e., for all 𝑘, 𝛼𝑘 is either 1 or 0.
IV. THE 𝑛-PLAYER GAME AND NASH EQUILIBRIA
A. Non-splittable Demands
First consider the case when the demands are not splittable,
i.e., when each player 𝑘 has to route all its traffic either
through the direct path (𝛼𝑘 = 1) or through the indirect path
(𝛼𝑘 = 0). In this case, we can have only pure Nash equilibria.
The following theorem states the existence of a pure Nash
equilibrium and characterizes the pure Nash equilibria.
1) Bidirectional Link:
Theorem 5. If A3 holds, then the assignment 𝜶 = (1, . . . , 1)
is a Nash equilibrium. Moreover, there cannot be a pure Nash
equilibrium with a player sending its traffic on the direct path
and another player sending its traffic on the indirect path.
Proof. When all players use the direct path, the cost for each
player 𝑖 is 𝜙𝑖𝑇 (𝜙𝑖). If only player 𝑘 deviates and takes the
indirect path, then the cost for player 𝑘 is 𝜙𝑘
∑
𝑖∕=𝑘 𝑇 (𝜙𝑖+𝜙𝑘)
which is strictly larger than 𝜙𝑘𝑇 (𝜙𝑘). Hence, the assignment
𝜶 = (1, . . . , 1) is a Nash equilibrium.
Suppose that there exist classes 𝑖 and 𝑗 such that 𝛼𝑖 = 0
and 𝛼𝑗 = 1. For all other classes 𝑘 ∕= 𝑖, 𝑗, we have 𝛼𝑘 equal
to 1 or 0. Then the cost for class 𝑖 is
𝐽 𝑖𝐼 = 𝜙𝑖
∑
𝑘 ∕=𝑖
𝑇 (𝛼𝑘𝜙𝑘 +
∑
𝑙 ∕=𝑘
(1− 𝛼𝑙)𝜙𝑙)
= 𝜙𝑖
∑
𝑘 ∕=𝑖
𝑇 (𝛼𝑘𝜙𝑘 + 𝜙𝑖 +
∑
𝑙 ∕=𝑘,𝑖
(1− 𝛼𝑙)𝜙𝑙)
= 𝜙𝑖𝑇 (𝜙𝑗 + 𝜙𝑖 +
∑
𝑙 ∕=𝑖,𝑗
(1− 𝛼𝑙)𝜙𝑙)
+𝜙𝑖
∑
𝑘 ∕=𝑖,𝑗
𝑇 (𝛼𝑘𝜙𝑘 + 𝜙𝑖 +
∑
𝑙 ∕=𝑖,𝑗,𝑘
(1− 𝛼𝑙)𝜙𝑙).
If only class 𝑖 deviates and takes the direct path, then, taking
𝛼𝑖 = 1 and 𝛼𝑗 = 1, the cost for class 𝑖 would be
𝐽 𝑖𝐷 = 𝜙𝑖𝑇 (𝛼𝑖𝜙𝑖 +
∑
𝑙 ∕=𝑖
(1− 𝛼𝑙)𝜙𝑙)
= 𝜙𝑖𝑇 (𝜙𝑖 +
∑
𝑙 ∕=𝑖,𝑗
(1− 𝛼𝑙)𝜙𝑙).
In that case, we have
𝐽 𝑖𝐼 > 𝜙𝑖𝑇 (𝜙𝑗 + 𝜙𝑖 +
∑
𝑙 ∕=𝑖,𝑗
(1− 𝛼𝑙)𝜙𝑙)
> 𝜙𝑖𝑇 (𝜙𝑖 +
∑
𝑙 ∕=𝑖,𝑗
(1− 𝛼𝑙)𝜙𝑙) = 𝐽 𝑖𝐷,
and player 𝑖 would deviate to use the direct path.
The following corollary is immediate from Theorem 5.
Corollary 5. If A3 holds, and
𝑇
(∑
𝑘
𝜙𝑘
)
< min
𝑖
∑
𝑘 ∕=𝑖
𝑇
(∑
𝑙 ∕=𝑘
𝜙𝑙
)
,
then the assignment 𝜶 = (1, . . . , 1) is the only pure Nash
equilibrium.
Proof. Theorem 5 rules out the possibilities of all pure
Nash equilibria, except 𝜶 = (1, . . . , 1) and 𝜶 = (0, . . . , 0).
The hypothesis of Corollary 5 rules out the possibility 𝜶 =
(0, . . . , 0).
2) Unidirectional Links:
Theorem 6. If A3 holds, then the assignment 𝜶 = (1, . . . , 1)
is a Nash equilibrium. Moreover, the assignment 𝜶 =
(1, . . . , 1) is the only pure Nash equilibrium.
Proof. When all players use the direct path, the cost for
each player 𝑖 is 𝜙𝑖𝑇 (𝜙𝑖). If only player 𝑘 deviates and routes
its traffic over the indirect path, then the cost for player 𝑘 is
𝜙𝑘
∑
𝑖∕=𝑘 𝑇 (𝜙𝑘) = (𝑛 − 1)𝜙𝑘𝑇 (𝜙𝑘) which is strictly larger
than 𝜙𝑘𝑇 (𝜙𝑘). Hence, the assignment 𝜶 = (1, . . . , 1) is a
Nash equilibrium.
Suppose that there exists a class 𝑖 such that 𝛼𝑖 = 0. For
any other class 𝑘, we have 𝛼𝑘 equal to 1 or 0. Then, the cost
for class 𝑖 is
𝐽 𝑖𝐼 = 𝜙𝑖
∑
𝑘 ∕=𝑖
𝑇
⎛
⎝∑
𝑙 ∕=𝑘
(1− 𝛼𝑙)𝜙𝑙
⎞
⎠
= 𝜙𝑖
∑
𝑘 ∕=𝑖
𝑇
⎛
⎝𝜙𝑖 +
∑
𝑙 ∕=𝑘,𝑖
(1− 𝛼𝑙)𝜙𝑙
⎞
⎠
> 𝜙𝑖𝑇 (𝜙𝑖) =: 𝐽
𝑖
𝐷,
where 𝐽 𝑖𝐷 := 𝜙𝑖𝑇 (𝜙𝑖) is the cost for class 𝑖 if player 𝑖 deviates
and routes all its traffic over the direct path. Hence, the
assignment 𝜶 = (1, . . . , 1) is the only pure Nash equilibrium.
B. Splittable Demands
For simplicity, in this subsection we assume that the de-
mands and the cost functions are symmetric. Clearly, the
equilibria are symmetric [7].
1) Bidirectional Links: The cost for a player 𝑘 is
𝐽𝑘(𝒙) = 𝑥𝑘𝑘𝑇 (𝑥𝑘) + (𝜙− 𝑥𝑘𝑘)
∑
𝑗 ∕=𝑘
𝑇 (𝑥𝑗) (3)
where 𝑥𝑗 is given by Equation (1). Differentiating 𝐽𝑘(𝒙) with
respect to 𝑥𝑘𝑘 and equating to zero, we get
𝑇 (𝑥𝑘) + 𝑥
𝑘
𝑘𝐺(𝑥𝑘)−
∑
𝑗 ∕=𝑘
𝑇 (𝑥𝑗)− (𝜙− 𝑥𝑘𝑘)
∑
𝑗 ∕=𝑘
𝐺(𝑥𝑗) = 0, (4)
where 𝐺(𝑥) = 𝑑𝑇 (𝑥)/𝑑𝑥. Since the equilibrium flow is
symmetric, for all 𝑘, 𝑥𝑘𝑘 = 𝑥 and
𝑥𝑘 = 𝑥 = (𝑛− 1)𝜙− (𝑛− 2)𝑥. (5)
Applying symmetry in Equation (4), we obtain
𝑥 =
𝑛− 1
𝑛
𝜙+
𝑛− 2
𝑛
Ψ(𝑥), (6)
where Ψ(𝑥) = 𝑇 (𝑥)/𝐺(𝑥), and, for each 𝑘, 𝑥 is the solution
of the following fixed point equation
𝑥 =
𝑛− 1
𝑛
𝜙+
𝑛− 2
𝑛
Ψ((𝑛− 1)𝜙− (𝑛− 2)𝑥).
Combining Equations (5) and (6), we also obtain
𝑥 =
2(𝑛− 1)𝜙
𝑛
− (𝑛− 2)
2
𝑛
Ψ(𝑥).
In general, the equilibrium values of 𝑥 and 𝑥 can be obtained
by solving the above two fixed point equations.
We next present examples in which an explicit expression
for the equilibrium is obtained.
Example 1. Assume 𝑇 (𝑥) = exp(𝜆𝑥). Then Ψ(𝑥) = 1/𝜆 and
we obtain at equilibrium:
𝑥 =
2(𝑛− 1)𝜙
𝑛
− (𝑛− 2)
2
𝑛𝜆
; 𝑥 =
𝑛− 1
𝑛
𝜙+
𝑛− 2
𝑛𝜆
.
Example 2. Let’s take 𝑇 (𝑥) = 𝑎𝑥𝑚 for some 𝑚 > 1. Then
Ψ(𝑥) = 𝑥/𝑚, and
𝑥 =
(𝑛− 1)(𝑚+ 𝑛− 2)𝜙
𝑚𝑛+ (𝑛− 2)2 ; 𝑥 =
2𝑚(𝑛− 1)𝜙
𝑚𝑛+ (𝑛− 2)2
2) Unidirectional Links: In this case, the cost for a player
𝑘 is
𝐽𝑘(𝒙) = 𝑥𝑘𝑘𝑇 (𝑥
𝑘
𝑘) + (𝜙− 𝑥𝑘𝑘)
∑
𝑗 ∕=𝑘
𝑇 (𝑥′𝑗).
where 𝑥′𝑘 is given by Equation (2). Differentiating 𝐽𝑘(𝒙) with
respect to 𝑥𝑘𝑘 and equating to zero, we get
𝑇 (𝑥𝑘𝑘) + 𝑥
𝑘
𝑘𝐺(𝑥
𝑘
𝑘)−
∑
𝑗 ∕=𝑘
𝑇 (𝑥′𝑗)− (𝜙𝑘 − 𝑥𝑘𝑘)
∑
𝑗 ∕=𝑘
𝐺(𝑥′𝑗) = 0
where 𝐺(𝑥) = 𝑑𝑇 (𝑥)/𝑑𝑥. Assuming that the equilibrium flow
is symmetric, we obtain 𝑥 = (𝑛 − 1)(𝜙 − 𝑥), where 𝑥 can
obtained by solving the following equation
0 = 𝑇 (𝑥) + 𝑥𝐺(𝑥)− (𝑛− 1)(𝜙− 𝑥)𝐺((𝑛− 1)(𝜙− 𝑥))
−(𝑛− 1)𝑇 ((𝑛− 1)(𝜙− 𝑥))
Example 3. Let’s take 𝑇 (𝑥) = 𝑎𝑥𝑚 for some 𝑚 > 1. Then
𝑥 =
𝜙
1 + 1𝑛−1
(
𝑚+1
𝑚+𝑛−1
)1/𝑚 ; 𝑥 =
(
𝑚+1
𝑚+𝑛−1
)1/𝑚
𝜙
1 + 1𝑛−1
(
𝑚+1
𝑚+𝑛−1
)1/𝑚
V. CONCLUDING DISCUSSION
We considered routing games on a circle with a bidirectional
link as well as with two unidirectional links carrying traffic in
opposite directions. Even with a simple demand matrix which
is the most extremely biased in favor of choosing the direct
path, we showed that it is clearly not obviously true that all
players send their traffic only on the direct path.
We showed that the Wardrop equilibrium for the symmetric
game on the bidirectional ring is globally optimal. It also easy
to show for this case that if the demands are asymmetric,
then the player with the largest demand gets the benefit of
being selfish by splitting its traffic over the two alternate paths,
and all other players are worse off at equilibrium. For the
unidirectional case, at Wardrop equilibrium, it is more likely
that the players split their traffic over the two paths.
In case of Nash equilibrium with non-splittable traffic, it
is more likely that all the players take the direct path. In the
splittable case, we obtained the explicit solution for a few
example cost functions.
In a transportation network the traffic in the two directions
are dependent due to possible existence of the intersections
at node locations. In the present paper, we have studied the
two extreme cases, namely, complete dependence as in the
bidirectional case no dependence as in the unidirectional case.
As future work, we would like to study the general case of
partial dependence between the two directions.
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